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Do forward-looking narratives affect investors’ valuation of UK FTSE all-shares firms? 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Narrative reporting is an important avenue for investors to know more about a 
company from the eyes of its board of directors. This study aims to examine the 
impact of forward-looking disclosures on the values of UK FTSE all-shares non-
financial firms. It uses a sample of annual report narratives from 2005 to 2014 to 
determine that the values of UK FTSE all-shares firms are positively influenced by 
the disclosure of forward-looking information. Besides, after distinguishing 
between high and low-performing firms, the study finds that forward-looking 
disclosures have no effect on the values of high-performing firms, though they 
positively enhance investors’ valuation of low-performing firms. Furthermore, the 
study concludes that when UK firms are divided based on the size of the audit firm 
(Big 4 vs. non-Big 4 auditors), forward-looking disclosures only positively affect 
the values of FTSE all-shares firms that are audited by one of the Big 4 auditing 
firms. Therefore, the results suggest that forward-looking information in UK 
narrative reporting statements is seen as credible for firms that are audited by a 
large auditor and/or are low-performing.  
      
Keywords: Narrative Reporting; Forward-Looking Information; Firm Value; UK 
JEL: M41 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Narrative reporting1 in annual reports provides critical textual information alongside financial 
statements (Merkley 2014). The reporting aims to analyze and discuss firm performance 
through the eyes of its board of directors (ASB 2005 and 2006). Likewise, investors analyze 
narratives to bridge the gap between financial statements and the economic reality of firms’ 
performances (Feldman et al. 2010). In the United Kingdom (UK), narrative reporting is 
reported under different headings, such as Operating and Financial Review (OFR), Business 
Review, and Chief Executive Review. The UK regulatory requirements of narrative reporting 
(i.e., IASB) recommend that narrative analysis and discussion should have a forward-looking 
orientation and that firms should provide this type of disclosure. This information would be 
expected to help investors understand firms’ past and current financial performances and to 
predict future earnings (Hussainey et al. 2003). However, opponents of narrative reporting 
argue that it may not be as useful as intended. The soft talk (vs. hard facts) nature of narratives 
makes them difficult to be audited and, therefore, may include substantial boilerplate 
information, generic language, and irrelevant disclosures (Li 2010). The International 
Accounting Standard Board (IASB) has consistently worried about informational contents of 
narrative reporting and has advised firms to avoid providing boilerplate and irrelevant 
disclosures (IFRS 2010). The current study empirically investigates the usefulness of UK 
narrative reporting.  
In particular, the objectives of the current study are threefold. First, the study examines the 
impact of the disclosure of forward-looking information on the values of UK FTSE all-shares 
firms. Second, it is argued that as earnings performance decreases the earnings signal becomes 
noisier and reported disclosure becomes less predictive of future value (Merkley 2014). In turn, 
managers increase their discussions and analyses on activities with a potentially positive effect 
on firms. However, they may use their discretion in preparing narrative disclosures to 
strategically obfuscate the financial results (Li 2010); particularly when firms are loss-making 
(Schleicher et al. 2007). Therefore, the current study differentiates between firms with earnings 
increase (high-performing) and earnings decrease (low-performing) to examine whether the 
association between forward-looking disclosure and firm value differ between high and low-
performing firms. Third, forward-looking information is disclosed outside the audited financial 
                                               
1 Throughout the current study, the terms narrative reporting, narrative disclosure, narrative statements, and 
narratives are used interchangeably. 
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statements. Thus, in absence of a mechanism to verify forward-looking information, investors 
may ignore it (Li and Yang 2016). However, external auditors review the narrative disclosure 
statements and so this may encourage managers to provide informative disclosure (Brown and 
Tucker 2011). Therefore, the current study differentiates between firms audited by one of the 
big auditing firms (Big-N) and firms audited by a non-Big auditor (Non-Big-N) to examine 
whether the association between forward-looking disclosure and firm value differs between big 
and non-big auditors.  
We consider UK forward-looking disclosures for a number of reasons. First, UK provides a 
unique context to analyze the disclosure of forward-looking information. This information is 
qualitative in nature and not immediately verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou and Hussainey 
2014). Besides, significant variations exist between UK firms in terms of their forward-looking 
disclosure practices (Wang and Hussainey 2013). This raises a concern about whether this type 
of disclosure is informative to investors. Second, UK forward-looking disclosure, on the one 
hand, contains valuable and relevant information for investors in anticipating future earnings 
(Hussainey et al. 2003). On the other hand, it may not be useful for real-time decision-making 
because of the relative delay in publishing annual reports. Besides, Wang and Hussainey (2013) 
argue that research investigating investors’ responses to UK narrative statements remains 
limited. Consequently, the usefulness of forward-looking disclosure in UK narratives remains 
an open empirical issue that requires more investigation, as undertaken by this paper.  
This paper provides two distinct contributions to the literature on narrative reporting and firm 
value. First, it provides timely evidence for how the disclosure of forward-looking information 
influences the values of FTSE all-shares firms over a 10-year period and finds that values of 
UK firms are positively associated with the disclosure of forward-looking information. It, also, 
contributes to the research calling for the distinction between profit and loss-making firms 
when investigating disclosure (e.g., Merkley 2014). Unlike prior research on UK forward-
looking disclosure (e.g., Hussainey et al. 2003: Wang and Hussainey 2013: Athanasakou and 
Hussainey 2014), the study distinguishes between high and low-performing firms and finds 
that forward-looking disclosures have no effect on the values of high-performing firms while 
positively affecting the values of low-performing firms. Furthermore, this study is the first in 
the UK to consider the role of the auditor in overseeing narrative disclosures. The study finds 
that forward-looking disclosures positively affect the values of UK firms only when they are 
audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms. These results are helpful for investors and 
researchers to understand the usefulness of UK narrative reporting practices. Given IASB’s 
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concerns about the usefulness of narratives, this study rationalizes the debate over the 
usefulness of forward-looking disclosure in the UK. It is considered an important source for 
information, particularly, for low performing firms. Thus, this may lead policymakers to 
encourage firms to disclose more forward-looking information to improve the information 
content of the annual reports and, consequently, enhances investors’ valuation of firms. 
Second, the study contributes to the knowledge on methodological developments in both the 
measurement of variables and the estimation method in empirical tests. Unlike prior research 
on firm value (e.g., Patel et al. 2002; Hassan et al. 2009; Zhang and Ding 2006; Plumlee et al. 
2015; Elzahar et al. 2015), this study computes an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio to 
measure the value of a firm. This measure reduces the potential bias arising from industry 
(Bebchuk et al. 2009), controls simultaneity, and helps to mitigate endogeneity problem 
(Brown and Caylor 2006). Furthermore, besides the fixed effect estimation, the empirical 
analyses are estimated using random effect panel regression to mitigate the problems caused 
by time effect (heteroscedasticity) and unobserved firm effect (auto-correlation). The random 
effect estimation method accounts for the residual dependency problems frequently neglected 
in market-based accounting research (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and formulates 
the research hypotheses; Section 3 details the research design; Section 4 reports the results; 
Section 5 introduces a robustness check, and section 6 presents the conclusion. 
2  LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this section, we review the three strands of literature that are relevant and consistent with 
the research objectives and, then, the research hypotheses are formulated. The first strand 
relates to the association between a firm forward-looking disclosure and its value. The second 
focuses on how a change in a firm performance could affect the association between forward-
looking disclosure and a firm value. The third focuses on how audit firm size could affect the 
association between forward-looking disclosure and firm value.  
2.1 Forward-looking disclosure and firm value 
Informative disclosures enhance investors’ perceptions of firms which are reflected in the value 
of the firm (Healy et al. 1999). Theoretically, an investor’s decision to acquire a firm’s financial 
securities depends on his/her expectations in terms of the firm’s future cash flows and/or its 
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returns based on the available information (Miller 2010). Forward-looking disclosure may 
enable investors to build their expectations about a firm’s future cash flows and/or its returns. 
Furthermore, information reduces liquidity costs, therefore increasing stock liquidity and 
reducing the rate of return required by investors to invest in a firm’s shares. This, in turn, affects 
the value of a firm. Agency theory, also, suggests that disclosures decrease information 
asymmetry between management and investors (Jensen 1986). Empirically, Van Buskirk (2012) 
uses a panel of 386 US firms from a retail sector and finds that quantity of disclosure is 
associated with a decreased information asymmetry. This may reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding a firm’s future performance, which in turn affects its share prices and, 
consequently, its value (Healy et al. 1999). In addition, voluntary disclosure (e.g., forward-
looking information) may reduce the private benefits that controlling shareholders and 
management might get from controlling the firm (e.g., monitoring costs). This would increase 
the expected cash flow to shareholders and, consequently, their firms’ values. 
Prior research examines the effect of disclosure on a firm value through its effect on the firm’s 
cost of capital. This stream of research argues that the value of the firm is a decreasing function 
of its cost of capital. In other words, the lower the firm cost of capital, the higher the firm value. 
This is because investors are willing to invest in a company with the lower cost of capital. This 
leads to increases in the expected cash flows from investors. Consequently, the flows of cash 
from investors will assertion the ability of the firm to increase its size and continue operating 
in large scale. A substantial body of research has examined this association between disclosure 
and the cost of capital, suggesting a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of 
capital, but a positive association between disclosure and firm value (e.g., Lam and Du 2004; 
Zhang and Ding 2006; Plumlee et al. 2015; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2013; Mangena 
et al. 2016). However, Botosan and Plumblee (2002) find that an increase in the level of 
disclosure is associated with a higher cost of capital. Then, they examined whether the 
relationship between disclosure and cost of equity capital varies based on the timing of 
disclosure. Their results suggest that annual report disclosures reduce the cost of equity capital; 
however, disclosures of quarterly reports increase the cost of equity capital. They do not report 
any association between investor relations and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, limited 
research has examined the effect of disclosures on the cost of capital due to asymmetric 
estimation risks. It has been argued that market beta is an increasing function of asymmetric 
estimation risk (Hassan et al. 2009). Consistently, prior research suggests a negative 
relationship between disclosure and market beta (e.g., Lam and Du 2004). Despite 
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aforementioned research on disclosure and the cost of capital, the nature of this relationship is 
still an open question. Empirical literature provides cross-sectional evidence that firms with 
more extensive voluntary disclosures exhibit less information asymmetry and have a lower cost 
of capital. However, there are substantial concerns about whether this relationship can be 
interpreted in a causal way. Firms are likely to choose disclosures with the effect on their cost 
of capital in mind, creating an endogeneity problem for which it is difficult to find valid 
instruments. The current study controls for the endogeneity problem in its empirical analysis.  
A limited number of studies have examined the impact of disclosure on firm value. This is 
because the disclosure-firm value relationship can be perceived as a logical conclusion rather 
than a hypothesis to be tested. Of these limited studies, Patel et al. (2002) use Standard and 
Poor’s dataset on Transparency and Disclosure (T&D) scores to examine the relationship 
between T&D scores and firm value. Their results suggest that firms with higher T&D scores 
have higher value compared to firms with lower T&D scores. However, they do not control for 
variables that may influence firm value, causing a problem of omitted variable bias. 
Furthermore, Hassan et al. (2009) find that the relationship between disclosure and firm value 
depends on whether the disclosure was mandatory or voluntary. They find negative association 
between firm value and mandatory disclosure of Egyptian firms. However, they report a non-
significant relationship between firm value and voluntary disclosure. Elzahar et al. (2015) 
examine the effect of disclosure of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) on the cost of capital 
and firm value. They find a significant negative relationship between the disclosure of KPIs 
and the cost of capital. However, they report a weak positive relationship between the 
disclosure of KPIs and a value of a firm. In a recent paper, Guo et al. (2016) find a positive 
relationship between disclosure and firm value in China. To conclude, the empirical evidence 
in terms of the impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm value is still inconclusive. Some studies 
report that disclosure of voluntary information adds to the value of a firm (e.g., Elzahar et al. 
2015) while others (e.g., Hassan et al. 2009) do not find evidence to support this assumption. 
Based on the review of the relevant theories and literature, it is suspected that the disclosure of 
forward-looking information has an effect the values of UK firms. Therefore, the current study 
hypothesizes that: 
H1: Forward-looking disclosures affect the values of UK firms 
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2.2 High and low-performing firms  
Earnings is a visible performance measure and receives considerable attention from investors 
due to its impact on firm growth process (Rasiah et al. 2014). The reporting earnings 
performance influence the investors’ demand for different types of disclosures and firms are 
willing to disclose different types of information (Merkley 2014). Consequently, changes in 
earnings performance may affect the frequency of a firm disclosure. However, this association 
between a firm earnings performance and its disclosure is unclear. Number of papers report a 
positive association between earnings performance and frequency of disclosure (e.g., Miller 
2002). While others report a negative association between the two variables (e.g., Merkley 
2014). Given that firm disclosure is critical to an investor decision-making process and have 
immediate pricing effect on stocks and investors assess the value of the company based on its 
disclosed information (Miller 2010). Together these issues create the possibility that a firm 
value may be affected by the frequency disclosure behavior derived by changes in firm earnings 
performance. Therefore, in this section we aim to examine whether the association between 
forward-looking disclosure and firm value differ based on changes in a firm earnings 
performance. 
The association between changes in earnings performance and narrative disclosure could be 
hypothesized either positively or negatively. A positive association may be explained on the 
basis that managers in firms with earnings increase are likely to provide more discussion and 
analysis about their performance in order to signal their favorable results to their investors. 
Consistently, Miller (2002) finds that firms experiencing an increase in their earnings tend to 
increase their disclosure, and as earnings performance returns to previous levels, their 
disclosure level decreases. On the other hand, a negative association may be hypothesized on 
the basis that information asymmetry increases as earnings performance decreases (Brown et 
al. 2009). Hayn (1995) argues that as earnings performance decreases the earnings signal 
becomes noisier and reported disclosure becomes less predictive of future performance. 
Therefore, investors demand more information to better assess the uncertainty of future cash 
flows and, in turn, managers provide more discussions and analyses. In addition, signalling 
theory suggests that firms with poor performance (e.g., losses) may provide more informative 
disclosure to explain losses to their investors and to signal their ability to eliminate such losses 
in the future. Recently, Merkley (2014) predicts that firms react to bad earnings performance 
by increasing discussion on activities with a potentially positive effect on future performance. 
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Empirically, he confirms his prediction and finds that firms increase their research and 
development (R&D) disclosure when earnings decrease. Thus, this suggests that change in 
earrings performance encourage managers to provide more discussions and analysis in their 
annual reports. 
Empirically, Smith and Taffler (2000) examine the ability of annual report narratives to predict 
a firm’s future financial status. They explore the association between discretionary narrative 
disclosures in the chairman’s statement and subsequent corporate failure. Employing linear 
discriminant analysis their study is able to correctly classify 65 out of 66 failed and non-failed 
firms with seven-variable word-based model. Thus, they provide evidence that unaudited 
managerial disclosures in the chairman’s statement contain important information which is 
highly associated with a firm’s future financial status. Furthermore, a number of prior studies 
focus on the effect of disclosure on the association between current earnings performance and 
future earnings.  For instance, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) use AIMR-FAF ratings to measure the 
quality of a firm’s information environment. They find evidence that higher levels of corporate 
disclosure are associated with a stronger relationship between current share price movements 
and future earnings changes. Similar findings are documented by in Hussainey et al. (2003) 
with a disclosure metric based on annual report narratives. However, none of the above 
research attempts at discriminating between firms with earnings increase (high-performing) 
and firms with earnings decrease (low-performing). Therefore, in the current study seeks to 
examine whether the association between forward-looking disclosure and firm value differs 
between high-performing and low-performing firms. We argue that changes in earnings 
performance affect the frequency of forward-looking disclosure which in turn influences the 
value of a firm. Therefore, based on the above discussion, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Forward-looking disclosures of high-performing and low-performing firms 
affect the values of UK firms 
2.3 Audit firm size  
Forward-looking information is disclosed outside the audited financial statements and therefore 
remains unverified. The absence of a mechanism to verify forward-looking information can 
lead investors to ignore it (Li and Yang 2016). Agency theory suggests that external auditor 
may act as an independent third party that may help to resolve the agency conflicts between 
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managers and investors. This may be because external auditors assure investors of the 
reliability of the accounting information and, therefore, reduce agency conflicts. External 
auditors assure investors on the credibility of accounting information (Fan and Wong 2005) 
and high-quality auditors encourage managers to disclose highly accurate information. Ball et 
al. (2012) find that management forecasts issued by firms committing to high-quality auditing 
firms are more frequent, specific, timely, and accurate. 
Investors consider big audit firms as providing ultimate auditing quality (Leung and Horwitz 
2010; Lawrence et al. 2011). This is because the big audit firms are more likely to have highly 
experienced, trained, and qualified auditors and, consequently, they are better in auditing 
performance compared to smaller audit firms (Barako et al. 2006). Firms with one of big audit 
firms are more likely to have higher relevant information than other firms. Clatworthy et al. 
(2012) investigate whether auditor quality moderates the role of accruals and cash flows, as 
components of earnings, in driving stock returns. Their empirical results indicate that both 
accruals and cash flows are important drivers of stock returns and suggest that the significance 
of both accruals and cash flows varies conditional on auditor quality. Brown and Tucker (2011) 
focus on narrative disclosure in management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the 
annual report and hypothesize that disclosure is potentially uninformative if it does not change 
from the previous year, especially after a significant change in firm performance. They measure 
the degree to which the narratives in the MD&A differ from the previous year. They find that 
firms audited by big auditors are more likely to change their narrative disclosure from period 
to period and the stock price responses significantly to change in the MD&A. This suggests 
that big auditors encourage managers to provide an informative narrative disclosure to 
investors. This knowledge leads us to formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3: Forward-looking disclosures of firms with high audit quality affect the values of UK firms 
as compared to firms with low audit quality 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN  
3.1 Sample selection and data collection 
Our investigation focuses on FTSE all-shares non-financial firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The sample period covers annual reports for fiscal years 2005-20142. The study 
begins with 2005 because the reporting standard RS1 on OFR narrative reporting was issued 
in 2005 (28 November 2005). The study ends in 2014, the year of the most recently available 
annual reports at the time of analysis. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Athanasakou and 
Hussainey 2014), financial firms are excluded from the analysis due to their special nature. In 
addition, we exclude observations: 1) with missing annual reports, as this study relies on the 
texts of annual reports; 2) whose annual reports cannot be converted to text file to be readable 
by QSR N6 software; 3) with missing financial data; and 4) that changed the month of the year-
end during the period. The screening leaves us with 2,932 firm-year observations. Panel A of 
Table (1) shows the final sample sorted by years. However, Panel B shows the distribution of 
the 2932 firm-year observations over nine main industries as follows: oil and gas 147 (5%), 
basic material 234 (8%), industrial 1026 (35%), consumer goods 323 (11%), health care 176 
(6%), consumer services 645 (22%), telecommunication 29 (1%), utilities 59 (2%), and 
technology 293 (10 %). 
Insert Table (1) here 
 
The study focuses on the narrative statements included in annual reports, as they are more likely 
to contain forward-looking disclosures (Athanasakou and Hussainey 2014). When reading the 
annual report, we find that narrative statements are included under different headings. Firms 
report narrative statements under the title of “OFR” (381 firms); or report in the two separate 
sections “Operating Review” and “Financial Review” (469 firms); or produce the same OFR 
contents under the title “Business Review” (1143 firms); or under the title “Chief Executive 
Review” (792 firms). These instances total 2,785 firms, representing 95% of the sample. The 
                                               
2 We use annual reports annual reports since external investors still perceive them to be an influential and credible 
source of information (e.g., Beattie et al. 2004). In addition, we utilize annual reports rather than interim reports 
to avoid seasonality and updates of originally reported interim data. 
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remaining 5% produce either only an “Operating Review” (88 firms) or a “Financial Review” 
(59 firms).  
Annual reports are collected from companies’ official websites, the Thomson One Banker 
database and the Northcote website (www.northcote.co.uk). All financial data comes from 
DataStream. Auditor type data is manually collected from the companies’ annual reports. 
3.2 Measurements of variables  
3.2.1 Forward-Looking Disclosure. The automated content analysis technique (e.g., Li 2010) 
using QSR N6 software is used to capture the level of forward-looking disclosure. Based on 
prior research (Hussainey et al. 2003; Muslu et al. 2015) and by reading and examining 30 
randomly selected narrative sections from annual reports, we develop a list of 33 forward-
looking keywords such as “looking ahead” and “expect”. Appendix (1) provides the list of 
keywords. In addition, conjugations are used with verbs that imply the future to reduce the 
likelihood of capturing noun forms of some verbs (such as “the company plans to ….”). 
Furthermore, the numerical reference to future years is added to the list of keywords (e.g., 
2013/2014 is used when text-searching annual report narratives of 2012). The forward-looking 
disclosure score (FLD score) is generated by counting the frequencies of sentences containing 
at least one of the 33 forward-looking keywords divided by the total number of sentences in 
the narrative section. As recommended in seminal research (e.g., Bowman 1984), sentences 
rather than words are used as the coding unit in the content analysis. This is because the word 
itself has no meaning if it is used in isolation of the meaning of the whole sentence (Beattie et 
al. 2004).  
To assess the reliability of the FLD score, a randomly selected sample from narrative 
statements is manually coded, and FLD score is calculated based on the manual coding. 
Following Hussianey et al. (2003), the Pearson correlation is used to compare the FLD score 
with manual coding and the FLD score with automated coding. A Pearson correlation 
coefficient of .926 shows that the FLD score based on manual coding is statistically correlated 
with the FLD score from automated coding at a .01 level of significance. This suggests that the 
FLD score calculated using computer software is reliable.  
3.2.2 Firm value. The value of the firm is measured at three months after the publication date 
of the annual report. This procedure ensures that financial reporting would be publicly available 
to users and that stock prices would reflect the FLD (Hassanein and Hussaieny 2015).  
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Following prior research (e.g., Ntim et al. 2012; Chin et al. 2006), the value of the firm is 
measured using Tobin’s Q ratio. However, we develop an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q 
ratio and refers to this variable as IMadj.TQ+3. This Tobin’s Q controls for potential bias arising 
from industry (Bebchuk et al. 2009), rules out the potential for simultaneity, and helps to 
mitigate endogeneity (Brown and Caylor 2006)3. The IMadj.TQ+3 is computed as a firm’s 
Tobin’s Q minus the median Tobin’s Q in the firm’s industry in the observation year. The 
Tobin’s Q is calculated as the summation of a firm total debt plus the market value of equity 
divided by its book value of total assets. The market value of equity is calculated as the number 
of outstanding shares at year-end multiplied by the mean of the stock prices at three months 
after the annual report date. 
3.3 Empirical Model  
In the empirical models, we control for some economic environment factors to account for 
alternative determinants of firm value in prior research (e.g., Elzahar et al. 2015). These include 
firm size, dividends, current earnings, liquidity, earnings volatility, managerial ownership, 
growth, and capital expenditure. Besides, a firm value may be affected by other types of 
voluntary narrative disclosures such as risk and environmental disclosure. Therefore, following 
prior research (e.g., Li 2010), we use the length of narrative reporting document to control for 
other types of disclosures that may affect firm value. Appendix (2) elaborates the definitions 
and measurements of all variables. To test our hypotheses, the study employed the fixed (Eq. 
1) and random (Eq. 2) effects models to regress forward-looking disclosure and control 
variables on firm value. These estimation models mitigate the problems of heteroscedasticity 
and auto-correlation (Gow et al. 2010). 
Equation (1) shows the fixed effect model that accounts for changes in firm value as a result of 
changes in forward-looking disclosure over the 10-years period under analysis. In addition, it 
accounts for any bias in firm values caused by ﬁrm and/or industry-speciﬁc effects. This model 
helps in correcting the standard error for any heteroskedastic bias (time effect from repressor 
                                               
3 The values of Tobin’s Q are widely varying across different industries due to differences in the operating nature 
of industries across the sample firms (Bebchuk et al. 2009). The industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q controls for 
variations among different industries which reduces potential bias resulting from differences in industries. Besides, 
this industry median Tobin’s Q reduces the variation between firms within the same industry which controls for 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity issues and cancels any firm fixed effects. This provides a consistent 
estimate of the residual in the endogenous variable (e.g., firm value). Consequently, the associations hold 
thereafter cannot be attributable to any endogeneity issues. 
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variables). β1 and β2 are the slopes for forward-looking disclosure score and control variables, 
respectively. αi is the intercept for firm i, while µit is the error term for firm i in year t. 
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Eq. (1) 
 
Equation (2) shows the random effects model that accounts for the bias in firm value caused 
by random variations across firms in the UK and across industries over the 10-year period 
under analysis. All variables are the same as in equation (1). Additionally, the error term is 
broadened from µit, which captures the between-firm error, to include Ɛit, which captures the 
within-firm error. This yields unbiased standard errors which would improve the accuracy of 
the analyses (Petersen, 2009). 
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Eq. (2) 
 
To test H1, both models (1) & (2) are run separately for the whole sample firms. To test H2, 
the sample is divided into two subsamples: high-performing and low-performing firms, based 
on the direction of change in the ROA ratio. Firms that have positive changes in ROA from the 
previous year (ΔROA>0) are regarded as high-performing firms, while firms with negative 
changes in ROA (ΔROA<0) are regarded as low-performing firms. Models (1) & (2) are run 
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separately for both high and low-performing firms. It should be noted that when calculating 
change in the ROA ratio from the previous year, the current study loses one year of 
observations for each firm. This suggests that there are no observations for the year 2005. To 
test H3, the sample is divided into two sub-samples based on the size of the audit firm: firms 
audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms (Big-N) and firms audited by a non-Big 4 auditor 
(Non-Big-N). Models (1) & (2) are run separately for both Big-N and Non-Big-N samples. To 
mitigate the effect of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile.  
4 RESULTS  
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Panel A of Table (2) presents the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. It shows that 
the UK firms have a maximum value of IMadj.TQ+3 (firm value) of 377.636 and the minimum 
value of -2.423. This range indicates that a variation exists between UK firms in terms of their 
values. The sample firms have an average value of 0.663. In terms of the FLD score, it ranges 
from 0.3% of total sentences in the narrative section to 85% of total narrative sentences. These 
values indicate that variations exist among UK firms in terms of their decisions to disclose 
forward-looking information. The sample firms have an average FLD score of 15% of the total 
narrative statements. Panel B presents the frequencies for dummy variables. It shows that 
80.01% of the UK firm is audited by one of the big audit firms (Big-N) whilst 19.9% are audited 
by non-big audit firms (Non-Big-N).  
Panel C of Table (2) reports the mean differences in firm value (IMadj.TQ+3) and forward-
looking disclosure (FLD score) based on changes in firm performance and the size of the audit 
firm. The t-test results suggest that there are signiﬁcant differences in forward-looking 
disclosure and values of UK firms based on firm performance and the size of the audit firm. 
The differences based on firm performance suggest that high-performing firms are likely to 
exhibit higher (lower) values (forward-looking information) than low-performing firms. 
Specifically, high-performing firms are likely to provide, on average, 19 percent less forward-
looking disclosure than low-performing firms. In addition, the values of high-performing firms 
are 34 percent higher than the values of low-performing firms.  However, based on the size of 
the audit firm, the t-test results suggest that firms with Big-N auditor firms are likely, on 
average, to exhibit less (more) forward-looking disclosure (firm value) than firms with non-
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Big-N auditor. In particular, the results confirm that firm audited by one of the Big-N auditors 
tend to provide, on average, 32 percent less forward-looking information than firm audited by 
non-Big-N auditor. In addition, the values of these firms are, on average, 39 percent more than 
those with non-Big-N auditor.  
Insert Table (2) here 
 
The Pearson correlation matrix in Table (3) provides evidence that firm value (IMadj.TQ+3) is 
statistically correlated positively with FLD score (p<0.01). This suggests that firm disclosing 
more forward-looking information are likely to exhibit higher values. Surprising, the 
correlation coefficient (-0.126) between IMadj.TQ+3 and firm ROA indicates a negative 
correlation between firm performance and firm value. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient 
between IMadj.TQ+3 and auditor size suggest a positive correlation between auditor size and 
firm value at 10 percent significance. The correlation coefficients, also, indicate that the 
disclosure of forward-looking information is negatively associated with both earnings 
performance (p<0.01) and size of the auditing firm (p<0.01). In addition, the Pearson 
coefficient may be used to diagnose multi-collinearity among independent variables. Among 
all variables, Pearson correlation coefficients are relatively low, less than 0.80, suggesting that 
there is no concern about the multi-collinearity problem (Tabachnick and Fidell 2007; Gujarati 
and Porter 2009). 
Insert Table (3) here 
 
4.2 Multivariate results  
Testing H1: Forward-looking disclosure impact on firm value  
Table (4) reports the multivariate results from fixed effect regression (Model 1) and random 
effect regression (Model 2). Both models (1) & (2) are statistically significant at a 1% level of 
significance (P<.01). The adjusted R-squared values are 86.78% and 86.44% for models (1) & 
(2), respectively. These values imply good overall model fit, indicating that both models 
explain some variations in the values of the UK FTSE all-shares non-financial firms. The t-
statistics and z-statistics are presented in parentheses for fixed and random effects estimates, 
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respectively. The current study finds that the coefficient for firm value (IMadj.TQ+3) on 
forward-looking disclosure scores (FLD score) is 7.907 in the fixed effect model and is 
statistically significant at a 1% level of significance (t = 8.42). In addition, it is 1.792 in the 
random effect model and is also significant at 1% level (z = 2.78). This result indicates a 
positive association exists between firm value and disclosure of forward-looking information. 
In other words, the values of UK FTSE all-shares firms are more likely to increase if these 
firms disclose more forward-looking information in the narrative sections of their annual 
reports. Therefore, H1 is accepted. However, the result is more positive and significant under 
the fixed effect model (t = 8.42) than under the random effect panel regression model (z = 2.78). 
This may be because panel regression model captures some of the within-firm effects that are 
not explained under the fixed effect model.  
This result is consistent with the theoretical expectations of the current study that investor’s 
decision to buy or hold a firm’s financial securities depends on his or her expectations regarding 
its future cash flows and/or its returns. These expectations are based on the use of all available 
information. Forward-looking disclosures may help investors determine their expectations 
about a firm’s future cash flows and/or its returns, which affects the value of the firm. 
Furthermore, information reduces liquidity costs, increasing stock liquidity and therefore 
reducing the rate of return required by investors to invest in a firm’s shares. This too affects 
the value of a firm. In addition, it is consistent with the expectation of the agency theory that 
disclosure of forward-looking information decreases the information asymmetry between 
management and investors. This, in turn, reduces uncertainty surrounding firm’s future 
performance, which affects its share price and, consequently, its value. In addition, forward-
looking information may reduce the private benefits that controlling shareholders and 
management might get from controlling the firm; this increases the expected cash flow to 
shareholders and, consequently, the firm’s value. The results are, also, consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Patel et al. 2002; Elzahar et al. 2015) that argues that voluntary disclosure adds 
directly to the value of a firm. In addition, the results go in line with prior studies which suggest 
positive association between voluntary disclosure and firm value after documenting negative 
association between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital (e.g., Zhang and Ding 2006; 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2013; Plumlee et al. 2015; Mangena et al. 2016).  
In terms of the control variables, the findings in both models, consistently with prior research, 
suggests that larger UK firms are more likely to have higher values in the future than smaller 
firms (e.g., Liu et al. 2012). In addition, UK firms with good dividends policies (higher 
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dividends yield) are likely to have lower values in the future. This is consistent with Officer 
(2011)’s expectation that dividends may limit management’s ability to make future investments, 
which lowers firm value. Furthermore, the coefficients on current earnings (ROA) suggests a 
negative association between earnings performance and firm value. However, this is not 
consistent with Hassan et al. (2009), who find a positive relationship between earnings levels 
and firm value. Moreover, the results indicate that UK firms with higher leverage and higher 
liquidity status are likely to have higher values in the future. Additionally, the coefficient on 
earnings volatility (Ear. Vol) is statistically significant at a 5% level under the fixed effect 
(Model 1) and is significant at a 10% level under the random effect (Model 2) suggesting 
consistent results with prior research that firms with higher volatility in earnings are more likely 
to have lower values (e.g., Rountree et al. 2008). The multivariate results, also, report that firms 
with higher growth are likely to have higher values in the future than firms with smaller growth. 
Some prior studies support this result, reporting a positive and significant relationship between 
firm growth and firm performance (e.g., Henry 2008). Furthermore, the coefficients on capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) are statistically negative at a 1% level, indicating that UK firms with 
increasing capital expenditures are likely to have lower values in the future which is consistent 
with Mangena et al. (2012). Also, the coefficients on length of narrative documents (LNGTH) 
indicate negative association between length of narrative documents (as proxy of other types 
of voluntary narrative disclosure) and future firm value. On the other hand, the coefficients on 
managerial ownership (%MO) are not statistically significant at any significance level, 
suggesting that the future values of UK firms are not likely to be affected by the percentage of 
their managerial ownership.  
Insert Table (4) here 
 
Testing H2: High-performing vs. low-performing firms  
In this section, we examine whether the disclosure of forward-looking information affects the 
value of firms with earnings increases or decreases differently. To this end, the sample is 
divided into two subsamples: high-performing and low-performing firms, based on the 
direction of change in the ROA ratio. Firms that have positive change in ROA from the 
previous year (ΔROA>0) are regarded as high-performing firms, while firms with negative 
change in ROA (ΔROA<0) are regarded as low-performing firms. When calculating change in 
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ROA ratio from the previous year, the current study loses one year of observations for each 
firm. This suggests that there are no observations for the year 2005. 
Table (5) reports the estimation using fixed effect (Model 1) and random effects (Model 2) for 
high-performing and low-performing firms, separately. For high-performing firms (∆ ROA>0), 
the coefficients on FLD score are not statistically significant at any significance level under 
either model. This result suggests that the future values of high-performing UK firms are not 
likely to be affected by the disclosure of forward-looking information. However, for low-
performing firms (∆ ROA<0), the coefficients on FLD score are statistically positive at a 1% 
level of significance in both models. This result indicates a positive association between FLD 
and the value of low-performing firms, suggesting that their future value is more likely to 
increase following the disclosure of forward-looking information. Therefore, H2 is partially 
accepted that only forward-looking disclosures of low-performing firms positively affect the 
values of UK FTSE all shares firms.  
These results may be explained from two perspectives. First, managers of high-performing 
firms feel that their investors are satisfied with their good performance and consequently do 
not require more information (Wallace and Naser 1995). Thus, any additional forward-looking 
disclosures may not influence the investors of high-performing firms. Second, managers of 
low-performing firms react to bad earnings performance by increasing their discussions about 
their activities with a potentially positive effect on future performance (Merkley 2014). This 
suggests that low-performing firms are more likely to provide informative narrative disclosures 
that enhance their market valuations. This is consistent with Merkley (2014) who finds that 
firms increase their R&D disclosure when earnings decrease. Besides, prior empirical research 
in the UK has also found that forward-looking information is more likely to be used by 
unprofitable firms than profitable firms (Wang and Hussainey 2013). In addition, Schleicher et 
al. (2007) find that loss-making firms provide more relevant information to their investors than 
profit-making firms. In sum, our results indicate that forward-looking information has no effect 
on the value of high-performing firms but does enhance investors’ valuation of low-performing 
firms. 
Insert Table (5) here 
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Testing H3: Big-N vs. non-Big-N auditors 
This section examines whether the association between FLD and value of FTSE all-shares 
firms may differ based on the size of the audit firm. To this end, the sample is divided into two 
sub-samples based on the size of the auditing firm: firms audited by one of the Big 4 auditing 
firms (Big-N) and firms audited by a non-Big 4 auditor (Non Big-N). Models (1) & (2) are run 
for the Big-N and Non Big-N Samples, separately.  
Table (6) reports the estimation using a fixed effect regression (Model 1) and random effects 
regression (Model 2) for both Big-N and Non-Big-N samples. While the coefficients on FLD 
score for Big-N auditors are statistically significant at a 1% level under models (1) & (2), these 
coefficients are non-statistically significant under any significance level for the Non-Big-N 
auditors’ sample. These results suggest a positive association between FLD and the future value 
of UK firms audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms. However, there is no association 
between the disclosure of forward-looking information and future values of firms audited by 
other audit firms. Therefore, these results suggest that disclosure of forward-looking 
information enhances future values of firms only when they are audited by one of the Big 4 
auditing firms. Therefore, H3 is accepted. The result is consistent with the expectation that big 
audit firms are more likely to assure investors on the credibility of accounting information (Fan 
and Wong 2005) and high-quality auditors encourage managers to disclose highly accurate 
information (Lawrence et al. 2011). Similarly, Hussainey (2009) finds that investors perceived 
firms audited by big auditing firms as providing more value-relevant information than others. 
In addition, Brown and Tucker (2011) find that large auditors encourage managers of US firms 
to provide informative disclosure to investors in their MD&A. 
Insert Table (6) here 
 
5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS   
We compare the random effect regression results with the fixed effect models (frequently used 
in prior research). The results of both models lead to identical conclusions in terms of the 
impact of forward-looking disclosures on the future values of UK FTSE all-shares firms. 
Furthermore, in the regression models, we exclude the year dummies, which implicitly control 
for periods of financial crises. Then, the current study controls for periods of financial crises 
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by adding a dummy variable in the regression models that is equal to 1 for the firm observations 
during the years 2007 and 2008 and 0 otherwise. The results, not tabulated, are largely 
unchanged. 
The results are further analyzed to examine the extent to which our variables are endogenous. 
Endogeneity is a statistical concern in the disclosure literature (Wang and Hussainey 2013). 
Omitted variable bias and simultaneity are the most frequent causes of an endogeneity problem 
(Chenhall and Moers 2007). This study addresses these two issues by conducting an 
instrumental Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression. The 2SLS is a widely used technique 
to detect endogeneity (Henry 2008; Ntim et al. 2012); it helps to eliminate and assess whether 
there are serious variations between the regressor variables and either the error term (omitted 
variables) or value of UK firms (simultaneity problem). To this end, we first introduce the 
lagged values of firm forward-looking disclosure, firm size, managerial ownership, growth, 
capital expenditure and length of narrative documents in the regression analysis as instrumental 
variables, and the other variables are introduced as regressor variables. The analysis is run for 
all sample firms, for high and low-performing firms and for the Big-N and Non Big-N samples, 
separately. This helps to observe any variation in firm values and to minimize the possible 
downsides of using the instrumental variables (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). 
Because of the effects associated with incorrect identification of instrumental variables, they 
are further validated to detect whether the data set exhibits endogeneity. The validity of the 
instrument is checked using Sargan and Basmann statistics. The presence of simultaneity is 
checked using Durbin and Wu–Haumsan statistics.  Sargan and Basmann statistics are used to 
examine over-identifying restrictions that may arise from using instrumental variables. The 
null hypothesis of these tests is that the mean value of the instrument and residuals are equal to 
zero. These two tests are based on the Chi-square statistic. In addition, Durbin and Wu–
Haumsan tests are used to examine the extent to which dependent and endogenous variables 
are exogenous. The null hypothesis of these tests is that the covariance of the endogenous 
variables and the residuals is equal to zero. The Durbin statistic is based on Chi-square statistic, 
and the Wu–Haumsan statistic is based on F-statistic. 
Table (7) reports the results of the endogeneity tests. Column (1) presents the results of 
endogeneity test for the entire sample of firms. Column (2) reports the test for high-performing 
and low-performing firm samples and column (3) reports the endogeneity test results for Big-
N and Non-Big-N samples. Sargan and Basmann statistics indicate that the instrumental 
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variables employed in the endogeneity tests are valid and are considered appropriate for the 
regression models. Durbin and Wu-Haumsan statistics suggest that the exogeneity of regressor 
variables are acceptable. These results indicate that there is no concern arising from 
endogeneity. 
Insert Table (7) here 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
This study examines how the disclosure of forward-looking information influences the values 
of UK FTSE all-shares non-financial firms over a ten-year period. In addition to the fixed effect 
model, the study adopts a random regression analysis model to consider the random effects 
within and between firms on the dependent variable (firm value) to mitigate the problems of 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. The automated content analysis technique is used to 
measure the level of forward-looking disclosure. The values of FTSE all-shares firms are 
measured using an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio. Our findings support the 
significant role of the disclosure of forward-looking information in improving the values of 
FTSE all-shares firms. Furthermore, when distinguishing between high and low-performing 
firms, the study finds that forward-looking disclosures have no effect on the values of high-
performing firms but positively affects the values of low-performing firms. Moreover, after 
separating firms audited by Big 4 auditing firms and firms audited by other auditing firms, the 
study finds that forward-looking disclosures positively affect the values of those UK firms 
audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms.  
The results have implications for regulators and investors in the UK. They support the UK’s 
regulatory trend regarding the disclosure of forward-looking narratives that help to assess a 
firm’s future performance. The findings rationalize the debate over the impact of forward-
looking disclosure on the value of UK firms, which may lead policymakers to encourage firms 
to disclose more forward-looking information to improve the information content of the annual 
reports and, consequently, enhances investors’ valuation of firms. In addition, Investors may 
also find these results useful, as they provide empirical evidence that the association between 
FLD and the value of FTSE all-shares firms may differ based on the type of auditor and 
direction of earnings. Investors might, therefore, be well-served to rely on such attributes (e.g., 
firms audited by big auditing firms or/and low-performing firms) to form their own 
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expectations about the value of the firm. Overall, our findings support the view that disclosing 
forward-looking information in the narrative sections of annual reports is seen as credible in 
the UK. 
Despite the robustness tests, the study has some limitations that can be considered potential 
areas for future research. First, this study focuses only on narrative reporting statements in the 
UK. Other countries, however, could have different approaches for narrative reporting. 
Investigating narrative reporting (particularly FLD) in other countries, such as Germany or 
Gulf countries, could be useful in understanding the usefulness of this type of disclosure. 
Furthermore, extending the current research design to include other countries may be an area 
of interest for future research and could help in observing the impact of country characteristics 
(e.g., inflation; culture; legal system; political factors) on the usefulness of narrative reporting. 
Second, the current study focuses on the quantity of forward-looking disclosure, but instead 
looking at the quality of forward-looking disclosures could allow researchers to observe 
whether there are differences between the results driven by the quantity or quality of 
information when measuring disclosures generally (e.g., Beattie et al., 2004) and forward-
looking disclosures in particular (e.g., Hassanein and Hussainey 2015).  
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix (1): List of forward-looking keywords 
 
Aim  
Anticipate  
Believe  
Coming  
Estimate 
Eventual  
Expect  
Following  
Forecast  
Forthcoming  
Future  
Hope  
Incoming  
Intend  
Intention  
Likely  
Look-ahead  
Look-forward  
Next  
Plan  
Predict  
Project  
Prospect  
Seek  
Shortly  
Soon  
Subsequent  
Unlikely  
Upcoming  
Well-placed  
Well-positioned  
Will  
Year-ahead 
The order of the keywords is alphabetical. 
In addition to this list of keywords, time indicators, conjugations, and reference to future years are 
added in the coding process.  
This Table includes the list of 33 forward-looking keywords. 
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Appendix (2): Definitions and measurements of variables 
 
Definition Acronym Operationalization 
 
Forward-looking 
disclosure  
FLD Total frequency of forward-looking statements divided by the total number 
of sentences in the narrative section of the annual report. For details, see 
section 3.2.1. 
 
Firm value  IMadj.TQ+3 Industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio at three months after the date of 
the annual report. It is computed as the firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the median 
Tobin’s Q in the firm’s industry in the observation year. The Tobin’s Q = 
[(total debt + market value of equity) / book value of total assets]. Market 
value of equity is calculated as the number of outstanding shares at year-end 
multiplied by the mean of the stock prices at three months after the annual 
report date. 
 
Firm size  LnMK Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the current year. 
Datastream code: WC08001. 
 
Dividend DY Dividend yield ratio. Datastream code: WC09402. 
 
Current earnings  ROA Firm return of equity ratio. Datastream code: WC08301. 
 
Leverage Lev Firm debt to equity ratio. Datastream code: WC08231. 
 
Liquidity CR Firm current assets to current liabilities ratio. Datastream code: WC08106. 
 
Earnings volatility  Ear.Vol Earnings volatility is measured as the coefficient of variation over the four 
years. The coefficient of variation is widely used in the related literature 
(e.g., MSW; Michelson et al., 1995) and is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the unscaled earnings series divided by the mean values.  
 
Managerial 
ownership 
%MO The percentage of total shares held by employees or those who have a 
substantial position that provides significant voting power at an annual 
general meeting. Datastream code: NOSHEM. 
 
Firm growth GRTH Firm sales growth ratio. Datastream code: WC08633. 
 
Capital expenditure  CAPEX Capital expenditure to assets ratio. Datastream code: WC08420. 
 
Length of narrative 
document  
LNGTH Total sentences in the annual report narrative sections.   
 
 
Audit firm size  Big-N 
Non-Big-N 
The sample is divided into two sub-samples based on the size of the auditing 
firm: firms audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms (Big-N) and firms 
audited by a non-Big 4 auditor (Non Big-N). The Big-N auditing firms are 
PwC, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and KPMG. The Non-Big-N are all auditors 
other than the Big-N.  
 
High and low 
performing firms  
High-
Preforming 
Low-
Preforming 
High-performing firms are firms with a positive change in ROA from the 
previous year (ΔROA>0). While firms with a negative change in ROA 
(ΔROA<0) are regarded as low-performing firms. 
 
 
Notes: This Table reports the definitions and measurements of all variables.  
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Table (1): Sample selection and allocation over years and industry  
 
Panel A: Sample distribution over years  
Years  Freq. Percent 
2005  256 8.73 
2006  251 8.56 
2007  259 8.83 
2008  278 9.48 
2009  297 10.13 
2010  306 10.44 
2011  323 11.02 
2012  320 10.91 
2013  323 11.02 
2014 319 10.88 
Total  2932 100 
   
Panel B: Sample distribution over industries  
Industries  Freq. Percent 
Oil and gas (0001) 147 5 
Basic materials (1000) 234 8 
Industrial (2000) 1026 35 
Consumer goods (3000) 323 11 
Health care (4000) 176 6 
Consumer services (5000) 645 22 
Telecommunication (6000) 29 1 
Utilities (7000) 59 2 
Technology (9000) 293 10 
Total  2932 100 
Notes: This Table provides the distribution of the sample among years industries. Our sample consists of 2932 
firm-year observations distributed over 10 years period (2005-2014) and 9 industries. The definition of the 
industry is based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
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Table (2): Descriptive statistics of variables  
Panel A: Descriptive - Continues variables  
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Firm value [IMadj.TQ+3] 0.663 8.684 -2.423 377.636 
Forward-looking disclosure [FLD Score] 0.158 0.055  0.003 0.363 
Firm size [LnMK]  12.434 2.215  7.870 18.038 
Firm Dividends [DY] 2.921 1.983  0.000 20.590 
Current Earnings [ROA]  5.552 6.046  -51.940 36.660 
Firm leverage [Lev]  21.452 72.298  0.0000 242.190 
Firm Liquidity [CR] 1.817 1.651  0.300 11.730 
Earnings volatility [Ear.Vol] 0.946 0.622  -0.220 2.900 
Managerial ownership [MO%] 8.649 15.678  0.000 99.000 
Firm growth [GRTH] 8.974 13.045  -38.930 73.830 
Capital expenditure [CAPEX] 5.655 5.242  0.150 27.970 
Length of narrative document [LNGTH]  431.573 640.902 10.000 7835.000 
 
Panel B: Frequencies- Dummy variables 
Variable Dummies Freq. Percent 
Auditor size  
0 586 19.9 
1 2346 80.01 
 
Panel C: Differences based on auditor size and firm performance    
 Firm performance   Audit firm size  
High  Low  t-statistics 
(Obs) 
Big-N Non Big-N t-statistics 
(Obs) Mean Mean Mean Mean 
FLD score  .151 .179 -6.501*** 0.147 0.194 -11.949*** 
IMadj.TQ+3 .196 .129 1.807* 0.198 0.120 2.282** 
Observations 1294 1382 (2676) 2346 586 (2932) 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics of continues variables in Panel A. While Panel B reports the 
frequencies of dummy variables. Panel C reports the differences in firm value and forward-looking disclosure based on 
firm performance and size of audit firm.  
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Appendix (2). 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
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Table (3): Correlation analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
(12) 
 
(13) 
(1) IMadj.TQ+3 
1.000             
             
(2) FLD Score 
0.076*** 1.000            
(0.000)             
(3) LnMK  
-0.060*** -0.298*** 1.000           
(0.003) (0.000)            
(4) DY 
-0.053*** -0.047** 0.039* 1.000          
(0.009) (0.020) (0.056)           
(5) ROA  
-0.126*** -0.140*** 0.359*** 0.095*** 1.000         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
(6) Lev  
0.918*** 0.009 -0.005 0.007 -0.08*** 1.000        
(0.000) (0.662) (0.796) (0.725) (0.000)         
(7) CR 
-0.005 0.096*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.09*** 1.000       
(0.786) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
(8) Ear.Vol 
-0.015 -0.044** 0.153*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.019 0.057*** 1.000      
(0.451) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.351) (0.005)       
(9) MO% 
0.007 0.178*** -0.35*** -0.03c -0.07*** -0.030 0.112*** -0.15*** 1.000     
(0.701) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) (0.000)      
(10) GRTH 
0.031 0.032 0.108*** -0.09*** 0.077*** 0.017 0.063*** 0.013 0.004 1.000    
(0.128) (0.111) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.386) (0.002) (0.528) (0.817)     
(11) CAPEX 
-0.035* 0.021 0.180*** -0.013 0.115*** -0.005 0.064*** -0.008 0.002 0.185*** 1.000   
(0.089) (0.314) (0.000) (0.512) (0.000) (0.800) (0.001) (0.676) (0.904) (0.000)    
 
(12) LNGTH 
0.029 -0.435*** 0.361*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.139*** -.129**** 0.072*** -0.159*** 0.010 0.035* 1.000  
(0.162) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.615) (0.088)   
 
(13) Auditor Size  
0.036* -0.225*** 0.453*** 0.145*** 0.123*** 0.227*** -0.227*** 0.161*** -.0313*** -0.010 .089*** 0.168*** 1.000 
(0.081) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.628) (0.000) (0.000)  
Notes: This Table presents the Pearson Correlation Matrix among all variables. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Appendix (2). 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1, respectively. 
 
34 
 
Table (4): Models (1) & (2) results: FLD impact on values of FTSE all-shares firms  
 
   Fixed-effect 
Model (1) 
 
Random-effect 
 Model (2)  
 
 Independent 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
 
Intercept   
-4.268*** 
(-4.61) 
-6.373*** 
(-4.76) 
Forward-looking disclosure  FLD (+) 
7.907*** 
(8.42) 
1.792*** 
(2.78) 
Firm size  LnMK (?) 
0.081** 
(2.05) 
0.172*** 
(2.98) 
Firm dividend  DY (?) 
-0.116*** 
(-4.61) 
-0.047*** 
(-2.73) 
Firm current earnings  ROA (+) 
-0.021*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.0217*** 
(-4.11) 
Firm leverage  Lev (−) 
0.111*** 
(117.95) 
0.101*** 
(165.31) 
Firm liquidity  CR (+) 
0.377*** 
(7.73) 
0.288*** 
(6.46) 
Earnings volatility  Ear.Vol (−) 
-0.315** 
(-2.52) 
-0.179* 
(-1.90) 
Managerial ownership  %MO (?) 
0.002 
(0.53) 
0.005 
(1.00) 
Firm growth  GRTH (+) 
0.010** 
(2.27) 
0.007** 
(2.07) 
Capital expenditure  CAPEX (?) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.051*** 
(-2.72) 
Length of narrative document  LNGTH (+) 
-.074*** 
(-3.17) 
-.039* 
(-1.66) 
Wald Chi-square  28068.29*** 
F-test 608.78***  
Adjusted R- squared (%) 86.78 86.44 
No. of observations  2932 2932 
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients estimate of models (1) & (2). The dependent variable is IMadj.TQ+3 – 
Firm Value measured using an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio at three months after the date of annual 
report. The t-statistics and z-statistics are presented in parentheses for fixed and random effects estimates, 
respectively. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Appendix (2). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table (5): Models (1) & (2) results: High-performing vs. low-performing firms    
 
   (1) High-performing firms (2) Low-performing firms   
   Fixed-effect 
Model (1) 
 
Random-effect 
Model (2)  
Fixed-effect 
Model (1) 
 
Random-effect 
Model (2)  
 
 Indep. 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
 
Intercept   
-2.326*** 
(-4.80) 
-2.672*** 
(-3.85) 
-5.437*** 
(-3.39) 
-5.631*** 
(-3.42) 
Forward-looking 
disclosure  
FLD (+) 
-.284 
(-0.46) 
-.232 
(-0.57) 
11.031*** 
(7.50) 
3.808*** 
(3.42) 
Firm size  LnMK (?) 
.116*** 
(4.91) 
.128*** 
(4.02) 
.123* 
(1.83) 
.145* 
(1.93) 
Firm dividend  DY (?) 
-.069*** 
(-3.48) 
-.048*** 
(-3.33) 
-.151*** 
(-4.15) 
-.091*** 
(-3.31) 
Firm leverage  Lev (+) 
.014*** 
(5.44) 
.022*** 
(9.90) 
.112*** 
(96.68) 
.103*** 
(127.59) 
Firm liquidity  CR (−) 
.123*** 
(4.51) 
.044** 
(1.95) 
.430*** 
(4.79) 
.405*** 
(4.72) 
Earnings volatility  Ear.Vol (+) 
-.037 
(-0.51) 
-.034 
(-0.62) 
-.614*** 
(-2.83) 
-.458*** 
(-2.64) 
Managerial ownership  %MO (−) 
.007** 
(2.59) 
.010*** 
(3.05) 
.007 
(0.92) 
.006 
(0.77) 
Firm growth  GRTH (?) 
.011*** 
(4.48) 
.005*** 
(2.67) 
.006 
(0.87) 
.006 
(1.11) 
Capital expenditure  CAPEX (+) 
-.009 
(-1.03) 
.002 
(0.03) 
-.046* 
(-1.87) 
-.048* 
(-1.73) 
Length of narrative 
document 
 
LNGTH 
 
(+) 
-.104*** 
(-3.108) 
-.080** 
(-2.532) 
-.006 
(-.177) 
-.005 
(-.170) 
Wald Chi-square  168.52***  17108.31*** 
F-test  6.30***  423.92***  
Adjusted R- squared (%) 10.53 9.52 89.90 89.79 
No. of observation  1294 1294 1382 1382 
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients estimate of models (1) & (2) for two sub-samples: high- and low-performing firms. The dependent 
variable is IMadj.TQ+3 – Firm Value measured using an industry median adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio at three months after the date of the annual 
report. The t-statistics and z-statistics are presented in parentheses for fixed and random effects estimates, respectively. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Appendix (2). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table (6): Models (1) & (2) results: Big-N vs. non Big-N auditors 
 
   (1) Big-N Auditors  (2) Non Big-N Auditors 
   Fixed-effect 
Model (1) 
 
Random-effect 
Model (2)  
Fixed-effect 
Model (1) 
 
Random-effect 
Model (2)  
 
 Indep. 
Variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
 
Coefficient 
(z-statistic) 
 
Intercept   
-1.616*** 
(-3.75) 
-1.426* 
(-1.74) 
-13.886*** 
(-2.84) 
10.093** 
(-2.08) 
Forward-looking 
disclosure  
FLD (+) 
.484*** 
(5.10)  
.602*** 
(4.49)  
.816 
(0.95)  
.539 
 (1.06) 
Firm size  LnMK (?) 
.102*** 
(5.34) 
.110*** 
(3.60) 
.491* 
(1.78) 
.431 
(1.51) 
Firm dividend  DY (?) 
-.025** 
(-2.17) 
-.007 
(-1.05) 
-.317** 
(-2.23) 
-.304** 
(-2.15) 
Firm current earnings  ROA (+) 
.006* 
(1.79) 
.003 
(1.56) 
-.115*** 
(-4.93) 
-.109*** 
(-4.79) 
Firm leverage  Lev (−) 
-.005 
(-0.29) 
-.009 
(-0.45) 
.113*** 
(66.70) 
.111*** 
(68.94) 
Firm liquidity  CR (+) 
.171*** 
(6.55) 
-.006 
(-0.33) 
.299* 
(1.84) 
.327* 
(1.96) 
Earnings volatility  Ear.Vol (−) 
.089 
(1.54) 
-.035 
(-0.90) 
-1.241** 
(-2.12) 
-1.245** 
(-2.16) 
Managerial ownership  %MO (?) 
.010*** 
(4.35) 
.005** 
(2.17) 
-.045*** 
(-2.81) 
-.044*** 
(-2.60) 
Firm growth  GRTH (+) 
.015*** 
(6.92) 
.002 
(1.61) 
-.0319* 
(-1.84) 
-.023 
(-1.41) 
Capital expenditure  CAPEX (?) 
-.001 
(-0.29) 
.002 
(0.24) 
-.046 
(-0.59) 
.0381 
(-0.48) 
Length of narrative 
document 
LNGTH (+) 
-.092*** 
(-3.703) 
-.056** 
(-2.444) 
.014 
(.295) 
.031 
(.664) 
Wald Chi-square  69.63***  5537.57*** 
F-test 9.08***  234.02***  
Adjusted R- squared (%) 9.45 4.43 4.07 4.06 
No. of observations  2346 2346 586 586 
Notes: This Table reports the coefficients estimate of models (1) & (2) for two sub-samples: firms audited by one of the Big 4 auditing firms 
(Big-N) and firms audited by non-big auditor (Non Big-N). Dependent variable is IMadj.TQ+3 – Firm Value measured using an industry 
median adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio at three months after the date of the annual report. The t-statistics and z-statistics are presented in parentheses 
for fixed and random effects estimates, respectively. 
Variables’ definitions and measurements are the same as summarized in Appendix (2). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. 
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Table (7): Endogeneity tests results 
  
 
All sample 
firms  
Firm performance 
 
Audit firm size  
 
High-
performing 
Low-
performing 
Big-N  
Auditor   
Non Big-N 
Auditor   
Sargan statistic 
1.523 
(.524) 
1.906 
(0.781) 
1.884 
(0.142) 
2.0966 
(0.8591) 
1.8276 
(0.6288) 
Basmann statistic 
1.253 
(0.540) 
1.679 
(0.787) 
1.723 
(0.185) 
1.8469 
(0.8657 
1.5036 
(0.648) 
Durbin statistic 
0.986 
(0.501) 
0.675 
(0.745) 
1.265 
(0.239) 
0.7425 
(0.8195) 
1.1832 
(0.6012) 
Wu–Haumsan statistic 
0.892 
(0.572) 
0.530 
(0.751) 
1.349 
(0.269) 
0.583 
(0.8261) 
1.0704 
(0.6864) 
Notes: This Table reports the endogeneity tests’ results for all sample firms, Big-N and Non Big-N auditors firms, and for 
high and low-performing firms, separately. 
The Chi-square and the F values are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
